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Abstract 
A transportation investment that materially improves links between centres opens up previously 
unavailable options for new activities. Traditional cost-benefit analysis does not adequately take 
account of the value of this option; real options theory must be added to the analysis to evaluate 
the full benefits. This paper uses a specific example, Auckland’s Harbour Bridge, to motivate the 
importance of real options analysis. Using illustrative, multi-period models of the real options 
problem, it highlights how inclusion of real options factors may either increase or decrease the 
attractiveness of a proposed investment. The models identify situations in which it is optimal to 
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1. Introduction 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an approach that authorities employ to assess major 
transport and other infrastructure developments. In the standard CBA approach, discounted 
benefits are expressed as a ratio of discounted costs to form a benefit cost ratio (BCR) and 
projects are ranked according to their ratio. In a world of certainty, or one where a certainty 
equivalence approach is warranted, traditional CBA represents a reasonable methodology. 
Specific aspects, such as valuing costs and benefits and specifying the discount rate, of course 
remain contentious. 
A more significant problem for CBA arises where the world is uncertain and multi-stage 
investments are being considered. In practice, as argued below, these conditions exist for 
virtually all major investments. In these circumstances, if new information arrives after the initial 
stage of a project has begun and before decisions on later stages are finalised, a certainty 
equivalent methodology misrepresents the value of initial investments. Instead, a methodology is 
required that incorporates the value of the “real option” that is created by an initial stage 
investment within a multi-stage investment programme. 
This paper examines the nature of decision-making and analysis in these circumstances, 
using transport infrastructure investments as a focus. A specific example – development of the 
Auckland Harbour Bridge and its motorway extensions – is used to illustrate the issues, but the 
methods are general. A problem with real options analysis, based as it is on financial options 
theory (Black and Scholes, 1973), is that the methodology for solving the value of the option can 
become highly complex. The approach here is to concentrate on the concepts involved in 
valuing the option, building on the decision-tree methodology outlined by Guthrie (2009) which 
in turn builds on Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The paper 
complements the conceptual treatment in Miller and Lessard (2008) and demonstrates the nature 
of option values through simple examples using the decision-tree approach. The purpose is to 
ensure that decision-makers have the conceptual tools to incorporate the existence of a real 
option into their analysis, even if judgement will inevitably be involved in calculating its value. 
2. Multi-Stage Investments and Options 
It is commonplace within CBA to include all costs and benefits accruing to the public as 
a result of a proposed investment. “The public” may be defined across a particular region or 
country, or globally. For instance, a rail project may include benefits accruing to existing 2 
 
residents who never use the train but who gain through reduced road congestion, rather than 
confining the analysis solely to benefits for the rail company and/or rail users. 
Typically, a CBA treats a new or upgraded transport link as a single-stage project. Such 
analysis typically considers benefits such as: travel time cost savings, vehicle operating cost 
savings, accident cost savings, seal extension benefits, driver frustration reduction benefits and 
vehicle emission reduction benefits (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2010; see also HM 
Treasury, 2010).  
However, deeper analysis suggests that many of the benefits of a new transport link take 
place via relocation of new activity to the area serviced by the project, following improvements 
in connectivity of that area to other locations. Given national and international mobility of 
resources, this new activity is not sourced solely from within the regional or national entity, but 
may arise from external sources. These additional resources add to local taxation revenues and 
may have other benefits such as increased productivity due to agglomeration benefits (Duranton 
and Puga, 2004; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Maré and Graham, 2009), and so represent 
genuine additions to local wealth. 
The timing of location decisions by agents does not need to coincide with the decision of 
the infrastructure investor. Agents may observe the progress of the infrastructure project and 
assess changing valuations of the benefits arising from the new infrastructure prior to making 
their own location decisions and consequent investments. Thus a new transport link tends to 
service a growing population of people and firms over time. The value of these subsequent 
location and investment decisions form part of the ambit of the analysis. Thus even a single-
stage infrastructure investment forms part of a multi-stage investment programme: the 
infrastructure investment is the initial stage and the multitude of subsequent investments form 
the latter stages. For convenience, we will refer to these subsequent investments as private 
investments in the remainder of the paper, but additional public investments are also relevant.  
The subsequent private investments will only be undertaken if, at the time of the private 
investment decision, the net benefit to the investor of investing is positive. The private investment 
decision may be taken only after the infrastructure investment has already been completed and 
after new information has arrived about the value to be gained from using the new 
infrastructure. The new information may be obtainable only by virtue of having the 
infrastructure in place and operational. In the following, we assume that the private investment 
would not occur in the absence of the infrastructure investment. Nor will it occur if the new 3 
 
information about the payoffs to the private investor reveal that a potential private investment 
yields a net cost rather than a net benefit.  
Thus creation of the infrastructure, being irrevocable once built, creates an asymmetric 
payoff: the private investment can only be considered if the infrastructure is built, and cannot be 
considered otherwise. However, the staged nature of decision-making means that the private 
investment is not committed to prior to completion of the new project. This sequencing allows 
new information to arrive between the time of the infrastructure project decision and the private 
investment decision. The asymmetry and the sequential decision-making process together give 
rise to the creation of the real option through the initial infrastructure investment. 
3. Examples  
Auckland, New Zealand’s largest city with an urban area population in 2011 of over 1.3 
million, is situated on two harbours. The CBD is situated on the southern side of one of these 
harbours (the Waitemata Harbour) with only a short stretch of water (less than one kilometre) 
between it and the harbour’s northern shore. McLauchlan (1989 pp. 81–4) documents that the 
1946 Royal Commission on Trans-Harbour Facilities examined whether a bridge should be built to 
connect the southern and northern shores.  
The Royal Commission report to Parliament “was very conservative in its estimates of 
traffic build-up and population growth on the North Shore.” McLauchlan comments: “A truly 
accurate estimate was difficult because a bridge itself would be the biggest incentive for 
population growth on the North Shore, but no one could be certain how much of an incentive.” 
Nevertheless, in 1953, the government approved construction of the bridge provided that it cost 
no more than five million pounds. Costs eventually climbed by 50% relative to this figure.  
The (tolled) bridge opened in May 1959 and its effects were immediate. McLauchlan 
documents:  
The rate of traffic vastly exceeded forecasts. In the first ten months, 4,092,307 vehicles 
used the bridge. The total was 5,543,973 in the year to 31 March 1961, 15,153,659 in the 
year to 31 March 1970 and exceeded 32 million by the mid-1980s. … The bridge 
triggered an explosion of development on the North Shore and the early traffic growth at 
more than 13 per cent a year led to the decision in 1964 to add two more lanes on each 
side of the bridge. 
A map of the Proposed Auckland Harbour Bridge, produced in the late 1940s or early 
1950s, shows a combined “North Side” population at that time of 26,820 (Alexander Turnbull 4 
 
Library, 2006, Plate 87). By 2006, the population of North Shore City alone had reached 217,000, 
and the combined population of North Shore City and Rodney District (further north but also 
connected to Auckland CBD by the bridge) was 309,000. The population of areas serviced by 
the bridge therefore increased approximately tenfold over 60 years. This compared with a 2.4-
fold increase in New Zealand’s population over the same time. 
A short motorway, the Northern Motorway, was built soon after the bridge, extending 
six kilometres northwards from the bridge. Starting from the early 1990s, this motorway was 
extended substantially (from Albany through to Silverdale), an 18 kilometre extension 
northwards that was completed in 2000. Grimes and Liang (2010) examined the effects of this 
extension on population, employment and land values in areas to the north of the bridge. The 
population in North Shore City that was within three kilometres of a newly opened motorway 
exit increased by 57% in the 15 years to 2006, compared with an increase of just 21% for the rest 
of the North Shore. Similarly, employment within three kilometres of a new exit increased by 
67%, compared with an increase of 34% in the remainder of the North Shore. In each case, the 
population and employment increases for areas close to a new exit considerably exceeded the 
increases for Auckland Region as a whole (38% and 55% respectively). Population and 
employment effects of the motorway extension in Rodney District were even more material. In 
the area closest to the northern-most exit of the motorway extension, the population rose by 
80% and employment rose by 120% in the 15 years to 2006.  
Using relative land value increases as a measure of the present discounted value of the 
benefits of the motorway extension, Grimes and Liang calculated a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) for 
the motorway extensions of at least 6.3, and possibly as high as 21.9. Ex post estimates of 
benefits using this method were approximately double the ex ante estimates of benefits for the 
project. The benefit calculations formulated using relative land value increases incorporate the 
value of the real option, which is embedded in the land values of the newly serviced area. This 
inclusion of option values can explain the jump in ex post measured benefits relative to ex ante 
expected benefits, where the latter do not incorporate the value of the real option. The 
approximate doubling in calculated benefits indicates that the value of the real option was 
approximately equivalent to the combined value of all other benefits calculated using the 
standard CBA approach. 
These two related examples illustrate the importance of understanding the nature and 
value of the real option created by a major infrastructure development. The Harbour Bridge case 
highlights the difficulties involved in estimating future demand for a transport link that 
potentially transforms the attractiveness of a newly serviced area for urban expansion. The 5 
 
Northern Motorway case provides a quantitative estimate of the value of the real option created 
by a new transport link. 
The nature of an option means that not all such major developments, even if chosen 
optimally ex ante, will be successful ex post. The reasoning for this is best illustrated by a financial 
option. A financial option may be purchased to give the opportunity to obtain a return (or 
protect against risk) in certain circumstances (e.g. if the exchange rate rises) but will not be 
exercised in other circumstances (e.g. if the exchange rate falls). In this latter case, the option will 
have zero value on expiry. However, this does not imply that initial purchase of the option was 
sub-optimal, since purchase was undertaken in a climate of uncertainty with respect to future 
outcomes and purchase may have been optimal to obtain the best ex ante risk-adjusted outcome 
for the investor. 
This logic needs to be incorporated into the analysis when interpreting unsuccessful 
historical infrastructure investments. One New Zealand road bridge investment, across the 
Mangapurua Stream near the Whanganui River, was completed in June 1936. It was built to open 
up a new area of farmland that had hitherto been unserviced by road access. However the 
farmland (and thence the bridge) proved to be uneconomic and access was closed entirely in 
1942.
1 This bridge has since been dubbed the Bridge to Nowhere. 
Belich (2009) documents a range of unsuccessful transport investments throughout the 
settler colonies in the 1800s. Canada, for instance, experienced “canal fever” in the 1820s and 
1830s, whereby it sought to emulate the success of New York’s Erie Canal in opening up new 
territory for development. Its per capita expenditure on canals at that time was above that even 
of Ohio and Indiana (two prominent US canal-building states). The Canadian canals proved to 
be financial failures, and Belich comments: “Contemporaries and historians alike were 
bewildered by the level of waste” (p. 286).  
Subsequently, in the 1850s, “railroad fever” took over from canals as the major transport 
development in Canada, with the construction of the Grand Trunk Line (primarily servicing 
Ontario and Montreal). Belich notes that the Grand Trunk Line was never profitable in itself. 
However other parts of the economy that used the rail line did boom: “Between 1844 and 1866, 
pine exports doubled, oak exports tripled and elm exports increased over fourfold” (p. 288). No 
modern study has been undertaken to assess whether, ex post, the rail investments were 
economically worthwhile once these broader economic benefits are assessed. But even if such an 
analysis were undertaken and showed that realised (discounted) benefits fell short of (discounted) 
                                                 
1 Information taken from the Department of Conservation sign situated at the bridge. 6 
 
costs, this would not be conclusive evidence that the investment was ex ante sub-optimal. The ex 
ante option value must also be incorporated into the analysis. Methods for doing so are detailed 
below. 
4. Analysis of Option Value 
The binomial approach to option valuation, outlined by Guthrie (2009), can be used 
conceptually to assess the value of a real option created by an infrastructure project. We consider 
two separate cases relating to a major bridge (or other transport) project. The examples have 
been chosen to show that consideration of option values can either decrease or increase the 
likelihood of current investment in the project relative to a decision based on standard CBA 
criteria. The standard CBA criterion in a capital-unconstrained world is to invest if the BCR > 1, 
and not otherwise. (In a capital-constrained world, the criterion is to invest in projects with the 
highest BCRs.) The criterion to invest if BCR > 1 is identical to a criterion to invest if the sum of 
discounted cash flows (ΣDCF) > 0.  
4.1.  Option Value of Waiting for New Information 
A classic result of the investment under uncertainty literature (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) is 
that investment may be sub-optimal even where BCR > 1. This can occur when: (a) an 
investment decision can be taken either in the current period or in the future; and (b) new 
information becomes available after the end of the current decision period. We outline a simple 
example of how this can occur. 
Consider a three-period model (t=0,1,2) in which the decision to build a bridge can be 
taken either at the start of t=0 or t=1. The (discounted) cost of the bridge is 1 if built in either of 
these periods.
2 If the bridge is built at t=0 there are positive payoffs in each of t=1 and t=2; if 
built in t=1, the payoffs occur in t=2 only. Payoffs are state-dependent, where the state of the 
world in t is summarised by i, the number of “bad” news events that have occurred prior to t. 
News in each period can be either “good” or “bad”. At t=0, i=0, since there have been no prior 
news events. At t=1, i can take the value of 0 (no bad news event during t=0) or 1 (one bad 
news event). At t=2, i can be 0, 1 or 2. The payoffs to the bridge in each period decline as the 
state of the world worsens (i.e. number of prior bad news events increases) for that period.  
The payoff matrix, with elements Y(i,t), is given in Table 1A for the case where the 
bridge investment is undertaken in t=0. In this case, Y(0,0) = -1, the construction cost of the 
                                                 
2 Thus, if the discount rate is x%, the dollar cost of the bridge is 1+x if built in t=1 and is 1 if built in t=0. The 
example does not rely on choice of discount rate or cost differences of the bridge between periods.  7 
 
bridge in t=0. If no bad news events occur, the payoff stream is Y(0,1) = 0.4 and Y(0,2) = 2 in 
t=1 and t=2 respectively. If a bad news event occurs during t=0, then the payoff in t=1 is Y(1,1) 
= 0.2. If no further bad news event occurs during t=1 then the payoff in t=2 is Y(1,2) = 0.5; this 
is also the payoff if a single bad news event occurs during t=1 but not during t=0. If a bad news 
event occurs during t=0 and t=1, the payoff in t=2 is Y(2,2) = 0.2.  
For the calculations that follow we assume that good and bad news events are equally 
likely, so the probability of a bad news event, p, is 0.5 in each period. (The method does not 
hinge on this particular choice of p.) If we treat the payoffs in Table 1 as discounted cash flows,
3 
we can calculate their sum for the project as viewed from the outset of period 0; this value is 0.1 
(noting that the probability that i=2 and i=0 in t=2 are each 0.25 while i=1 has probability 0.5).
4 
Thus, according to the conventional CBA approach, the project should proceed since ΣDCF > 0 
(i.e. BCR > 1). 
Consider, however, if the potential investor waits until t=1 to make a decision regarding 
the project. If i=0 at t=1, the investor knows that good news occurred at t=0 although there is 
still a risk of bad news during t=1 (after the investment choice has been made). The investor 
faces the payoffs shown in Table 1B. The investment cost is now incurred at t=1 and the 
positive payoffs for that period are lost (due to construction only being completed at the end of 
the period). However the possibility of two bad news events has been averted, and so the 
potential payoffs in period t are either Y(0,2) or Y(1,2) from Table 1A. If the investor is in this 
state, the investment should proceed in t=1 since ΣDCF = 0.25 > 0.
5  
If, at t=1, the investor had instead observed a bad news event at t=0, she will face the 
payoffs shown in Table 1C if she decides to invest. Again the construction cost must be borne in 
t=1, while the potential payoffs in t=2 are now either Y(1,2) or Y(2,2) from Table 1A. If the 
investor is in this state, the investment should not proceed since ΣDCF = -0.65 < 0.
6 Since the 
investment will not proceed in this case, the actual ΣDCF = 0; i.e. no investment occurs and 
hence no cash-flows take place.   
                                                 
3 In the next example, we analyse the method used to discount cash flows in more detail. 
4 ΣDCF = -1+0.5(0.4)+0.5(0.2)+0.25(2)+0.5(0.5)+0.25(0.2) = 0.1. 
5 ΣDCF = -1+0.5(2)+0.5(0.5) = 0.25. 
6 ΣDCF = -1+0.5(0.5)+0.5(0.2) = -0.65. 8 
 
Table 1: Payoffs with Single Investment Opportunity 
Table 1A: Payoffs Y(i,t) at period 0 
   t (period) 
i  0  1  2 
0  -1.0  0.4  2.0 
1     0.2  0.5 
2        0.2 
ΣDCF = 0.1. 
 
Table 1B: Payoffs Y(i,t) at period 1 with i=0  
   t (period) 
i  0  1  2 
0    -1.0  2.0 
1       0.5 
2         
ΣDCF = 0.25. 
 
Table 1C: Payoffs Y(i,t) at period 1 with i=1 
   t (period) 
i  0  1  2 
0       
1     -1  0.5 
2        0.2 
ΣDCF = -0.65. 
Since a good and a bad news event are equally likely in t=0, the expected ΣDCF (at t=0) 
if the investor chooses to wait until t=1 to make her investment decision is 0.125 (i.e. an equal 
weight on each of ΣDCF = 0.25 and ΣDCF = 0). This value is greater than that obtained by 
investing at t=0. Hence waiting is preferred to investing immediately, even though the 
conventional CBA approach recommends investing at t=0 given the positive ΣDCF calculated 
for an investment in that period. 
The key to this result is that under conditions of uncertainty where (a) valuable new 
information is obtained over time, and (b) there is a choice of period in which the project can be 
constructed, there is a positive option value attributable to waiting. This does not always favour 
waiting, since the value of the option will be payoff dependent. For example, if Y(0,1) = 0.6 
instead of 0.4 in Table 1, it would be optimal to build the bridge in t=0 rather than t=1. Thus, 
while the option is a contributor to overall value, it is not necessarily the dominant component. 9 
 
Its presence, however, can change the decision of whether or not to invest immediately relative 
to a CBA approach that does not incorporate the explicit option value of waiting and learning. 
4.2.  Creation of Private Sector Option Value 
The previous example showed how consideration of option value can lead to a more 
conservative approach to investment than would be recommended by a standard CBA approach. 
This is the most well-known result of the investment under uncertainty literature. However, for 
the purposes of a major infrastructure investment that opens up the opportunity to develop new 
territory (as with the Auckland Harbour Bridge), a less conservative approach to investment 
relative to a standard CBA recommendation may be warranted. This result derives from an 
alternative set of assumptions as follows. 
Consider a public sector infrastructure provider that has the opportunity to build a 
bridge which opens up a new area for development. We consider a three-period model (t=0,1,2) 
in which the bridge can be built in t=0, or not at all. This restriction means that we do not have 
to consider the potential option of waiting, discussed above, although the generality of the issues 
considered here transfers to a model where the timing of the infrastructure project is also a 
choice variable.  
In each period there is uncertainty about future states of the world, but learning occurs 
as time proceeds. If the bridge is not built, the payoff in each of t=0,1,2 is set at 0. The cost of 
the bridge is 1, and hence the net payoff in t=0 is -1 if the bridge is built. Henceforth (unless 
otherwise stated) we consider payoffs on the assumption that the bridge is built. The private 
sector can develop the new area at t=1 if and only if the bridge is built.  
Private sector development leads to growth in the population and employment of the 
city. We assume that this growth is sourced from outside the region of analysis and so represents 
new resources for the relevant region. Private sector development only occurs in t=1 if it is 
expected to be profitable over the life of the development (i.e. over t=1,2).  
News about the state of the world in t=1 can again be either “good” or “bad”. This news 
is only revealed during t=0, and so is not known at the time the bridge investment decision has 
to be made. The private sector development choice occurs at the start of t=1. Table 2 shows two 
payoff matrices; Table 2A shows payoffs if the private sector chooses to develop, and Table 2B 
shows payoffs if the private sector does not develop. [B,G] indicates that decisions to build the 
bridge [B] and to develop (grow) the area [G] are both taken; [B,N] indicates that a decision to 
build the bridge was taken but that the private sector decided not to further develop the area [N]; 10 
 
[D,N] denotes the case where the initial decision was “do not” build the bridge (and hence do 
not develop the area).  
 Each payoff is again denoted Y(i,t). For each of the [B,G] and the [B,N] cases, the initial 
period payoff is given as Y(0,0) = -1 (being the cost of the bridge project). For the [B,N] case 
(the bridge is built but no development takes place), Y(0,1) = 2 and Y(1,1) = 0, as shown in 
Table 2B. If private sector development occurs in t=1, i.e. [B,G], we assume that this private 
development cost is 1. Thus the net payoffs in t=1 if new development occurs are -1 (=0-1) in 
the bad state and 1 (=2-1) in the good state, as shown in Table 2A. 
 
Table 2: Payoff Matrices for Multi-stage Investment 
Table 2A: Payoffs Y(i,t) for [B,G] 
   t (period) 
i  0  1  2 
0  -1  1  25 
1     -1  -5 
2        -12 
 
Table 2B: Payoffs Y(i,t) for [B,N] 
   t (period) 
i  0  1  2 
0  -1  2  1 
1     0  -1 
2        -5 
 
After t=1 (i.e. after the private sector development decision has occurred), further news 
is revealed. Thus, in t=2, there are again three potential states of the world (i=0,1,2). If no 
private sector development has occurred, i.e. [B,N], the payoffs in t=2 corresponding to i=0,1,2 
are 1, -1 and -5 respectively. If private sector development has occurred, i.e. [B,G], the respective 
payoffs in t=2 are 25, -5 and -12 respectively. The more pronounced negative outcomes with 
poor states of the world (i=1,2) reflect the extra costs involved in expanding the city boundaries 
when it would have been preferable to remain within the original boundaries. The large benefit 
when two good states have occurred (i=0) reflects the positive returns to expansion when that 
expansion is supported by a sequence of good news events. The payoffs in each case are shown 
in column t=2. 11 
 
A brief note is in order here about the specification of the payoffs. Each payoff is 
deterministic once the (i,t) combination is revealed. Thus the payoff for [B,N] with two bad 
outcomes is known to be Y(2,2) = -5. This payoff is the utility payoff at t=2 in state of the world 
i=2; it is not the dollar return. At an aggregate level, the consumption capital asset pricing model 
(Breeden, 1979) can be used to assess the utility payoff for any dollar return. For instance, a one 
dollar return in bad times will have a higher utility payoff than a one dollar return in good times. 
A corollary of measuring the payoffs in utility terms, where each payoff is deterministic 
once the (i,t) combination is known, is that the real risk free rate is the appropriate discount rate 
to use to discount future payoffs to the present (Guthrie, 2009). In our example, we use a real 
risk free rate of 4% per annum (i.e. a discount factor of 1.04). 
The payoff matrices from Table 2 can be used to perform a discounted cash flow 
analysis
7 as would typically be done for a cost-benefit analysis. Table 3 shows the net DCFs 
(discounted to t=0) corresponding to Table 2, using a 4% p.a. discount rate. In order to arrive at 
an expected value, we must specify the probability (p) of each news event (i.e. each state 
transition) being bad; we again adopt p=0.5 for convenience.  
 
Table 3: Discounted Cash Flows 
Table 3A: DCFs for [B,G] 
 
ΣDCF = -0.31  
 
Table 3B: DCFs for [B,N] 
   t (period) 
i  0  1  2 
0  -1.00  1 .92  0.92 
1     0.00  -0.92 
2        -4.62 
ΣDCF = -1.43 
                                                 
7 Strictly speaking, this is a discounted utility analysis, but we will retain the usual nomenclature. 
   t (period) 
i  0  1  2 
0  -1.00  0.96  23.11 
1     -0.96  -4.62 
2        -11.09 12 
 
The sum of ex ante discounted cash flows (ΣDCF) for each case is shown beneath each 
portion of Table 3. Typically, a CBA considers whether either of these totals is positive. In the 
first case, if both the bridge and private developments proceed, the ex ante discounted cashflow is 
negative (-0.31); thus, ex ante, a two-stage development is not warranted according to the 
conventional CBA criterion. In the second case (the bridge is built but no further development 
proceeds), the ex ante discounted cashflow is again negative (-1.43) and so a single-stage bridge 
development is also unwarranted using the conventional CBA criterion. Thus a standard CBA 
will reject the bridge project because it yields a negative ΣDCF (i.e. BCR < 1) and the negative 
ΣDCF holds whether or not the subsequent private development is undertaken. 
However, conventional CBA, as above, misses the value of the option that the bridge 
creates. An option provides the opportunity, but not the obligation, to exercise an investment 
choice in a future period. In our bridge example, the private developers, having observed the 
value of i at t=1, have the option at t=1 of choosing whether or not to invest in developing the 
area opened up by the bridge, but not the obligation to do so. 
To examine the worth of the option, we adopt a value function approach, as displayed in 
Table 4. Each cell shows the forward-looking value of being in that position, given the existing 
value for i, at time t. In t=2, the value in each cell, V(i,t), is therefore identical to the equivalent 
payoff, Y(i,t), in Table 2.  
The value for V(0,1) equals the payoff at that time, Y(0,1), plus the discounted worth of 
the probability-weighted potential values in t=2 [V(0,2) and V(1,2)].
8 The same approach is 
adopted for each other cell at t=1 in the two matrices. Similarly, V(0,0) is calculated as the payoff 
at that time, Y(0,0), plus the discounted worth of the two probability-weighted potential value 
functions in t=1 [V(0,1) and V(1,1)].
9  
The resulting V(0,0) corresponds exactly to the sum of the discounted cash flows 
presented in Table 3 in each case, so for both the [B,G] and [B,N] cases, V(0,0) < 0. Again, 
consistent with the DCF approach, a conventional CBA would conclude that the bridge should 
not be built since the value of the multi-stage project is negative whether or not private 
development subsequently occurs. However, these values are still calculated prior to taking the 
option into account and would only be an appropriate valuation of net benefit if the choice 
between private development (G) or none (N) were irrevocably committed to at t=0. In fact, 
that choice is made only at t=1. 
                                                 
8 Thus, in the [B,G] case, 10.62 = 1+ (0.5*25-0.5*5)/1.04. 
9 Thus, in the [B,G] case, -0.31 = -1+ (0.5*10.62-0.5*9.17)/1.04. 13 
 
To see how this choice affects the analysis, consider the nature of the private 
development decision at t=1 if the bridge had been built at t=0. If i=0, the developer has V(0,1) 
= 10.62 if the development proceeds, i.e. [B,G], while V(0,1) = 2.00 if there is no development, 
i.e. [B,N]. Thus if i=0 at t=1, the developer will maximise value by developing since 10.62 > 
2.00.  
If i=1 at t=1, the developer has V(1,1) = -9.17 if development proceeds, i.e. [B,G], while 
V(1,1) = -2.88 if there is no development, i.e. [B,N]. Thus if i=1 at t=1, the developer will 
maximise value by choosing not to develop since -2.88 > -9.17. 
Viewed from t=0, the bridge investor will optimally recognise that the decision tree will 
diverge depending on the value of i at t=1. If good news occurs after the bridge is built, the 
private development will take place, but no further development will be undertaken if bad news 
occurs at that time. The two relevant values in t=1 are therefore shown in bold, one in each of 
the [B,G] and [B,N] cases. The actual value of the project at t=0 if the bridge is built, V(0,0), will 
then be equal to the payoff in t=0, Y(0,0), plus the discounted worth of the two probability-
weighted (bolded) potential value functions in t=1 being V(0,1), from the [B,G] case, and V(1,1) 
from the [B,N] case. In our example, this yields V(0,0) = 2.72.
10  
The resulting project value prior to any investments occurring, V(0,0), is positive, and 
thus the project should proceed. The choice to build the bridge is optimal, but is contrary to the 
conclusion derived from a standard CBA that recommends against the bridge project, since 
BCR<1 either with or without the subsequent private development. The optimal approach 
incorporates the value of the option, whereas the standard CBA approach ignores its value. With 
multi-stage decision-making, coupled with the ability to update information and alter decisions 
between stages, a conventional CBA therefore fails to incorporate all benefits of a project. 
Specifically, it fails to incorporate the option benefit related to future investment decisions made 
by other investing parties that can only be taken conditional on the infrastructure investment 
being undertaken in the initial period. 
The results derived from this example are instructive for interpreting the merits of actual 
historical decisions. In some circumstances, an investment may have been optimal to proceed 
with ex ante when viewed from t=0 where the option value is included in that assessment but, ex 
post, subsequent information may lead to a [B,N] outcome rather than a [B,G] outcome. If the 
[B,N] outcome occurs, the project will not be viable either with or without subsequent private 
sector development. Thus one may be left with a “white elephant” such as an unprofitable canal 
                                                 
10 I.e. 2.72 = -1 + (0.5*10.62-0.5*2.88)/1.04. 
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or railroad or a “bridge to nowhere”. A simple historical ex post analysis, undertaken with the 
benefit of hindsight, might conclude that the investment was foolhardy or poorly researched 
(and of course this might be the case for some projects). However, the investment decision to 
build may nevertheless have been optimal ex ante even though the subsequent information made 
the investment unprofitable.  
 
Table 4: Value Function Matrices 
Table 4A: Value functions V(i,t) for [B,G] 
   t (period) 
i  0  1  2 
0  -0.31  10.62  25 
1     -9.17  -5 
2        -12 
 
Table 4B: Value functions V(i,t) for [B,N] 
   t (period) 
i  0  1  2 
0  -1.43  2.00  1 
1     -2.88  -1 
2        -5 
 
One implication of the inevitable ex post failure of some transport projects – that were 
optimally chosen to proceed – is that a portfolio approach to infrastructure investment, as in 
standard finance applications, should be considered. Each investment can be considered as part 
of a portfolio of investments. It is the return (and risk) on the total portfolio which is of 
importance, not the outcome for any single investment. Thus, rather than considering whether 
each project turned out to be warranted ex post, a more comprehensive and appropriate 
assessment would examine whether the portfolio of transport investments added value, given 
that each project was assessed legitimately ex ante inclusive of option value.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates two key implications of incorporating option values into the 
analysis of major transport (and other infrastructure) projects where information is uncertain and 
can be updated over time. First, where timing of the infrastructure investment itself is a choice 
variable, the option to delay construction has value. This raises the hurdle rate for the project 15 
 
relative to a situation where (a) the investment cannot be delayed (i.e. must be undertaken now 
or never), or (b) new information regarding the benefits or costs of the project is not expected to 
arrive within the time horizon for decision-making. Most projects will have some elements of (a) 
or (b), so there is a case for applying some premium to the discount rate in order to account for 
this aspect of option value. 
Second, where additional private (or public) sector decisions are taken subsequent to the 
infrastructure project’s construction, the project can create a valuable option for other investors 
that provides them with the opportunity, but not the obligation, to invest in ways that utilise the 
new project. The key requirements for a project to create positive option value in this way are: 
(a) project decisions are made sequentially; (b) there exists uncertainty concerning the value of 
future stages of a project; and (c) flexibility is retained about whether successive projects are 
undertaken or not, with decisions on those projects reflecting new information that comes to 
hand after the completion of earlier projects in the sequence. Under these circumstances, the ex 
ante economic value of a sequence of projects can be greater than the discounted present value of 
the expected future cash flows. The reason for this result is that value is increased through the 
creation of options for subsequent sequential choices through the completion of initial projects.  
The potential for projects to “fail” ex post, even when proceeded with optimally ex ante, 
implies that public sector investors should treat infrastructure projects as part of a portfolio of 
projects. Provided that each project is optimally assessed ex ante, it is the return and risk on the 
portfolio of projects that should be the focus for accountability, rather than the ex post outcome 
on any one project.  
In the case of a major new transport link, such as a major bridge, the range of subsequent 
investors may be very wide. It includes every potential firm and household that could locate in 
the newly serviced region, and most of these potential investors will be unknown at the time of 
initial construction. Thus it is impossible to contract ex ante with those who may gain as a result 
of the infrastructure investment. Ex post, however, if the project proves to be worthwhile, 
standard spatial equilibrium arguments (e.g. Roback, 1982; Haughwout, 2002; Glaeser and 
Gottlieb, 2009) imply that land values will rise subsequent to the project’s announcement.  
A range of land value capture mechanisms can then be used to extract some or all of the 
proven benefits of the project (Coleman and Grimes, 2010). Thus public sector investors can 
seek to extract the value of the option that they create through the imposition of financing 
techniques such as betterment taxes or tax increment financing. Whether or not these financing 
alternatives are available should not, however, detract from the overarching result that project 16 
 
assessment of a multi-stage infrastructure project needs to incorporate the value of the option 
created for other potential investors. 
One extension for the use of this method of analysis is worth noting. Howell and Grimes 
(2010) discuss considerations that should be borne in mind when considering the merits of 
(costly) large-scale investments in fast fibre for broadband purposes, as is currently being 
proposed by public bodies in many countries. The fibre investment creates the option for firms 
and households to utilise fast broadband services that would be unavailable without the fibre 
availability. Availability of fast broadband through the fibre investment can spur innovations by 
potential users that use the new network. In the absence of the fibre investment, the innovation 
could be stifled since there would be no way of applying such an innovation domestically. 
However, the infrastructure provider cannot know which firms will choose to innovate and so 
cannot capture the full benefits of such innovation. Furthermore, the fibre investor cannot be 
sure that innovations using the network will ultimately occur, since the infrastructure only 
provides the opportunity, not the obligation, for such innovation to occur. The analytical 
properties of this issue are identical to the bridge example, and so the same techniques can be 
applied to the fibre decision as outlined here for a new transport link. 17 
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